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Contribution	towards	an	ethics	of	listening:	an	improvising	musician’s	
perspective.	
Simon	Waters	
(SARC,	Queen’s	University	Belfast)	
	
	
	
Preamble	
	
The	following	paper	began	as	a	semi‐improvised	presentation	for	“Translating	
Improvisation”1	‐	a	project	bringing	together	practitioners	from	many	disciplines,	
but	here	particularly	lawyers	and	improvising	musicians	‐	with	the	goal	of	better	
understanding	the	role	of	improvised	conduct	in	ethical	and	social	transformation.		
As	the	author	has	no	philosophical	training	it	might	be	useful	to	disclose	the	loose,	
inexpert	senses	of	the	terms	ethics	and	empathy	being	used	here,	and	to	clarify	the	
relationship	between	them.	Ethical	conduct	is	here	assumed	to	involve	voluntary	
filtering	or	deferral	of	individually‐oriented	goals	in	the	interests	of	longer‐term,	
emergent,	(socially)	co‐constructed	benefit.	Empathy	is	regarded	as	a	key	
mechanism	through	which	individuals	develop	and	test	a	capacity	to	comprehend	
“the	other”	(whether	construed	as	singular,	plural	or	multiple).	This	mechanism	
may	involve	risk,	doubt,	potential	loss,	a	deferral	of	existing	knowledge:	a	potential	
“othering”	of	the	self.	Empathy	is	explored	interpersonally	through	the	intimate	
and	erotic,	but	also	in	such	mutually	co‐constructed	behaviours	as	musical	
improvisation,	in	which	“meaning”	is	congruent	with	participation.	As	the	objects	
with	which	we	surround	ourselves	(such	as	musical	instruments)	act	as	prosthetic	
sensors,	amplifiers	and	transducers	of	our	interactions	with	our	environment,	and	
with	others,	it	is	also	suggested	that	a	capacity	for	empathy	can	be	imaginatively	
designed	into	the	non‐human	agents	with	which	we	interact.	Rather	than	
presenting	improvising	(musical	or	otherwise)	as	necessarily	productive	of	ethical	
conduct,	empathy	is	here	regarded	as	essentially	improvisational,	and	potentially	
transformative.	
	
	
	
	
To	talk	of	an	ethics	of	listening	we	have	to	go	beyond	the	mundane	vernacular	
concept	(of	listening)	and	approach	an	extended	intersensorial	concept	of	
listening:	one	in	which	all	the	senses	are	involved.	That’s	not	to	say	that	the	
Schaefferian	concept	of	“reduced	listening”	(Schaeffer)	‐	a	focusing	on	the	
phenomenal	detail	of	sound	‐	or	Pauline	Oliveros’s	already	intersensorially‐
inclined	“deep	listening”	(Oliveros)	don’t	have	considerable	utility	in	increasing	
our	capacity	for	aural	discrimination.	Just	that	for	ethical	interaction	to	occur,	
the	more	information	we	have,	the	better	prepared	we	are	to	make	good	
judgments.	And	intersensorial	information	is	already	relational:	it	already	enfolds	
multiple	streams	of	evidence	which	might	modulate	or	even	conflict	with	each	
other.	
	
We’re	familiar	with	this	in	everyday	life	in,	for	example,	the	sense	of	knowing	
that	what	someone	says	in	purely	semantic	terms	is	not	necessarily	what	they	
mean.	As	Lakoff	and	Johnson	and	others	(e.g.	Austin)	have	taught	us,	language	
isn’t	primarily	propositional	‐	it’s	primarily	performative;	and	to	evaluate	
performance	(human	conduct	in	all	its	forms)	we	need	all	the	contextual	
information	we	can	get:	aural,	visual,	tactile,	atmospheric,	visceral.	
	
But	it’s	not	even	this	type	of	nuanced	but	quotidian	interpretive	listening	(all	too	
familiar	to	lawyers	from	life	in	court)	that	I	wish	to	discuss	here.	I	regard	it	as	
established	that	language	isn’t	primarily	propositional:	the	paradox	that	it	is	still	
frequently	presented	as	such	is	just	something	the	law	has	to	deal	with.	
As	an	improvising	musician	my	interest	is	here	particularly	in	links	between	the	
tactile	and	the	sonic:	in	the	apparently	shared	bank	of	experiences	of	the	
material	and	phenomenal	world	which	precede	(and	possibly	even	afford)	
language	and	musicking,	while	simultaneously	imbuing	them	with	the	potential	
for	meaning.	My	contention	is	that,	in	an	environment	in	which	we	are	
perpetually	over‐stimulated,	the	link	between	the	sonic	and	the	tactile	remains	a	
primary	index	of	verification	‐	of	trust,	if	you	like	‐	not	least	because	the	
correlation	between	sonic	and	tactile	gesture	or	resistance	is	difficult	to	fake.	
	
Why	might	this	be	important	for	an	ethics	of	listening?	Because	ethics	is	about	
how	human	beings	balance	their	inquisitiveness	about	the	other,	and	about	
otherness,	with	the	production	of	a	sense	of	self2	‐	about	how	to	approach	and	
engage	with	otherness	without	appropriating	that	other.3	We	call	the	capacity	to	
do	this	empathy	‐	it’s	the	most	sophisticated	human	skill	‐	and	the	link	between	
the	sonic	and	the	tactile	is,	I	believe,	one	fruitful	route	to	the	study	of	it.	
	
That	our	inquisitiveness	has	an	equal	basis	in	our	early	interaction	with	other	
humans	and	with	the	physical	world	draws	our	attention	to	the	agency	of	non‐
human	actors	within	complex	networks	of	behavior.	This	might	be	important,	
not	least	for	the	law,	in	adequately	recognizing	and	evaluating	the	role	of	
environment,	or	of	apparently	“irrelevant”	objects	or	elements	in	emergent	
situations.	Further,	it	suggests	that	one	might,	by	acknowledging	the	role	of	such	
non‐human	actors,	be	able,	to	some	extent,	to	“plan	for”	empathy,	for	example	by	
recognizing	the	active	role	of	place	or	location	in	establishing	negotiations	
regarding	conflict	resolution,	or	by	designing	devices	which	encourage	
negotiated,	dynamic	engagement.	This	is	an	issue	to	which	I’ll	return	below.	
	
What	Small		calls	“musicking”	‐	the	“making	and	doing”	of	music	‐	is	so	obviously	
tied	up	with	the	business	of	organizing	time	‐	whether	this	be	precise	
synchronization,	the	formal	relation	of	materials	over	time,	the	organisation	of	
memory	and	cross‐reference	or	the	“almost”	suspension	of	time	which	
improvisers	describe	when	they	are	inside	the	process	of	performing	‐	that	it’s	
easy	to	forget	that	it’s	also	about	the	organization	of	space;	of	proxemics	(Hall)	‐	
of	touch,	intimacy,	localness	and	the	environmental	and	the	relations	between	
these.	Proximity	and	adjacency	imbue	musical	organization	at	every	level:	the	
different	genres	with	which	we’re	familiar	emerge	at	least	in	part	as	solutions	to	
the	logistics	of	the	physical	organization	of	the	participants4,	or	of	their	
relationships	with	the	potentialities	of	their	instruments5.		
	
Numerous	theorists,	from	Blacking	through	Small	and	beyond,	have	noted	the	
homologies	between	music’s	“internal”	organization	and	its	broadly	(often	
characterized	as	“extra‐musical”)	social	function,	but	what	I’m	most	concerned	to	
draw	attention	to	here	is	musicking’s	exploration	of	the	privileged	relationship	
between	sound	and	proxemics.	Indeed	I’ve	elsewhere	characterized	musicking	
as	touching	at	a	distance	(Waters	“Touching”).	An	entire	unwritten	history	of	
musical	listening	could	be	framed	in	terms	of	whether	sounds	are	intimate,	local	
or	environmental	with	respect	to	the	listener:	with	whether	we	are	“grabbed”	or	
“seduced”	or	have	to	“find	our	way	into”	the	music’s	materiality.	Entire	
industries	have	grown	up	on	managing	this	inter‐relationship,	notably	(recently)	
production,	mastering	and	the	various	cinematic	sound	diffusion	formats.	The	
microphone	and	electronic	repetition	and	distribution	have	foregrounded	this	
aspect	of	musicking	as	never	before.	To	paraphrase	my	writing	on	performance	
ecosystems	elsewhere	(Waters	“Performance”)	the	whole	of	pop	music	emerges	
initially	from	the	amplification	and	projection	of	the	intimate	human	voice.	
Forensically	close‐miked	breath	sounds	which	were	previously	the	preserve	of	
porn	movies,	and	tinselly	fret	noise	are	used	to	connote	honesty,	integrity,	
connection,	lack	of	illusion	and	unpluggedness.	
	
The	reason	I	perhaps	overstress	music’s	engagement	with	proxemics	and	timing	
is	that	I	suspect	that	the	mechanisms	of	empathy	are	similarly	bound	up	with	a	
heightened	sensitivity	to	microtemporal	variations	in	stimulus	and	response,	
and	with	dynamic	(though	usually	cautious)	transgressions,	heurisms	and	
renegotiations	of	the	invisible	thresholds	of	proxemic	domains.		
	
Improvisation	(as	an	organizing	principle)	inherently	recognizes	that	one	can’t	
set	up	or	wait	for	an	ideal	context.	The	context	or	situation	is	always	already	
given:	it	is	now.	The	experience	and	expertise	which	can	be	drawn	upon	in	an	
improvisation	is	what	is	here	‐	what	is	to	hand,	rather	than	what	might	be	
potentially	or	ideally	useful.6		
	
Autobiography	
	
As	a	way	of	contextualizing	my	route	to	thinking	through	the	relationship	
between	listening,	improvising,	empathy	and	ethics,	I	will	indulge	in	a	brief	
autobiographical	aside.	As	a	practitioner	with	“theoretical	pretentions”	I’ve	
always	been	concerned	to	try	and	tell	better,	more	accurate	stories	of	what	we	
do	when	we’re	doing	practice.		Writing	in	the	early	1990s	about	my	
electroacoustic	composition	work	I	was	interested	in	moving	narratives	of	such	
practice	away	from	descriptions,	however	accurate,	of	the	sound	and	its	
organization,	and	towards	what	humans	do	when	they	use	technology	in	music‐
making,	identifying	the	latter	as	the	salient	aspect	of	then	current	practice.	A	
series	of	(my	own)	titles	riffing	on	Benjamin	(e.g.,	Waters	“The	Musical	Process”)	
should	perhaps	have	alerted	me	earlier	to	the	fact	that	this	was	already	a	long	
(and	old)	story,	and	that	it	would	perhaps	have	been	better	to	start	by	asking	
what	an	un‐technologised	musical	practice	might	look	like.		
	
Having	therefore	caught	up	with	the	idea	that	music	is	ubiquitously	
technologised	I	moved	to	narratives	which,	drawing	initially	on	James	Gibson’s	
(1979)	ecologically‐framed	writings	on	perception	and	then	from	embodied	and	
situated	cognition	(e.g.	Gallagher),	tried	to	think	about	performance	as	
ecosystemic:	as	always	involving	networks	and	interdependences	between	
people,	things	and	environments	(and	ideas)	in	(musical)	making.	The	work	of	
Lucy	Suchman	(2007)	and	my	then	research	colleague	John	Bowers	(2003)	gave	
me	a	way	of	understanding	my	narratives	of	my	own	practice	and	that	of	my	
students	as	doing	ethnographic	work.	As	a	performer	in	physical	theatre	
companies	I	was	acutely	aware	of	the	extent	to	which	performance	extends	
offstage	into	daily	life.	
	
Later,	teaching	in	an	institution	with	a	history	of	involvement	in	interaction	
design	I	became	increasingly	concerned	with	how	humans	behave	in	their	
conduct	with	objects	and	ideas	(rather	than	what	designers	or	composers	
assume	or	hope	they	will	do)	and	came	to	realise	the	privileged	context	which	
musical	improvisation	gives	for	studying	the	ad	hoc,	the	shiftingly	heuristic,	the	
adaptive,	the	unforeseen	and	the	fleeting	in	the	network	of	relations	between	
humans	and	things.	
	
Practice	
	
In	practice‐based	activities,	doing	is	a	form	of	knowing:	meaning	emerges	
through	participation.	It’s	also	a	form	of	speculation,	of	research.	The	qualities	of	
dynamic,	context‐sensitive	conduct	which	are	characteristic	of	musicking	are	
also	characteristic	of	cooking	or	gardening,	and	of	social	interaction	and	
relationship	making7.	This	type	of	knowledge	is	sustained	by	continuous	activity.	
To	paraphrase	Impett,	while	in	some	contexts	we	can	consider	scientific	
knowledge	to	be	cumulative,	knowledge	produced	through	art	is	always	
processual	and	performative	‐	it	needs	to	be	constantly	engaged	with	to	sustain	
its	emergent	truths	(19).8	Such	knowledge	has	an	ambivalent	relationship	with	
(propositional)	language.	
	
Language,	Speculation	and	Improvisation	
	
Lakoff	and	Johnson	may	have	drawn	our	attention	to	the	origin	of	language’s	
meaningfulness	in	touch	and	physicality,	but	the	habitual	deployment	of	
language	as	if	it	were	propositional	conceals	or	masks	this	reality.	Language	can	
afford	the	opportunity	of	conduct	at	too	much	remove	from	the	tactile	to	be	
entirely	trustworthy.	Music,	and	particularly	improvised	music	(which	privileges	
the	speculative	over	the	propositional)	is	somehow	closer	to	its	origin	of	
meaningfulness	in	the	physical	than	is	language.	It	more	readily	admits	of	its	
status	as	touching	at	a	distance,	and	in	doing	so	it	allows	us	to	explore	intimacies	
without	the	invasiveness	of	actual	touch,	but	without	the	“forgetfulness	(of	
origin)”	of	propositional	language.	And	we	can	hear	in	the	proto‐linguistic	
experiment	of	infants	the	transition	from	the	speculative	performative/poetic	
mode	which	operates	in	music	(and	in	poetry)	to	languaging	in	the	propositional	
sense.	
	
One	reason	why	musical	improvisation	may	be	such	a	potentially	fertile	ground	
for	understanding	human	relations	and	activity	is	its	status	as	a	practice	which	
appears	not	to	rely	on,	or	at	least	to	downplay,	talk.	It	is	a	“tacit	knowledge”	par	
excellence.	In	a	very	real	sense	it	needs	no	theorizing	and	can	be	understood	
entirely	by	being	in	the	practice.	Competence	in	it	is	gained	by	becoming	part	of	
the	community	of	practice,	and	there	are,	to	paraphrase	Collins	(2001)	no	hidden	
structures	which	underlie	the	practice,	or	which	need	to	be	understood	in	order	
to	participate.		
	
Conduct	within	improvisation	is	its	meaningfulness.	In	this	regard	the	
improviser’s	frequent	shyness	of	talk	about	improvising	may	significantly	reflect	
natural	language’s	habitual	concern	with	propositional	logic,	and	downplaying	of	
the	performative	or	poetic.	In	short,	improvisation	is	usually	much	more	
concerned	with	how	than	with	what	‐	or	with	what	is	shown,	rather	than	what	is	
told.	
	
And	of	course	this	is	how	empathy	works	too.	
	
Empathy	
	
Empathy	‐	the	capacity	to	engage	successfully	or	mutually	beneficially	with	
others	‐	would	seem	to	have	only	two	preconditions:	curiosity	(inquisitiveness)	
and	trust.	“Success”	in	an	empathic	exchange	might	be	defined	by	the	willingness	
of	those	involved	to	voluntarily	continue	the	interaction,	and	“ethical	conduct”	by	
acknowledging	that	the	process	of	mutual	calibration	and	exploration	cannot	be	
achieved	only	through	simple	mimetic	behavior:9	that	there	needs	to	be	a	degree	
of	risk‐taking,	and	that	any	outcome	is	emergent	and	unknowable.	
	
As	a	practitioner	rather	than	a	philosopher	my	loose	heuristic	take	on	empathy	is	
that	it	is	processual,	and	involves	non‐appropriative	recognition	of	qualities	and	
processes	of	difference	and	otherness.	It	is	an	opening	of	the	self	to	the	other.	As	
I	suggested	above,	the	other(s)	in	question	need	neither	be	animate,	nor	sentient,	
despite	a	vernacular	understanding	that	empathy	occurs	between	living	
creatures.10	Empathy	embraces	unknown‐ness	and	unfamiliarity	not	in	the	spirit	
of	the	homo	economicus	who	engages	with	another	for	personal	gain,	nor	entirely	
in	the	mode	of	disinterested	altruism,	but	in	the	mode	of	enhanced	mutual	(and	
therefore	ultimately	socially	or	community‐oriented)	emergent	richness	of	
potential.	Potential	is	not	regarded	as	goal‐oriented,	but	as	a	space	of	further	
possibility	‐	of	recognizing	“other”	ways	of	being	‐	of	an	increasing	of	options	‐	of	
surplus.11	
	
Empathy	and/as	“Play”	
	
Improvisation	is,	fundamentally,	behaviour	which	privileges	trust	over	prior	
knowledge.	Far	from	being	irrational,	such	behaviour	enables	humans	to	engage	
in	interaction	faster,	and	with	more	complexity,	than	other	organizational	
strategies.	Like	its	strong	relations,	instinct	and	intuition,	it	affords	rapid,	supple,	
dynamic	conduct.	And	competence	in	improvised	behaviours	builds	stability	into	
broader	(social)	structures,	as	even	in	contexts	where	trust	proves	misplaced,	
adaptation	to	the	new	context	is	a	more	likely	outcome	than	“failure”.	
	
So	improvising	‐	playing	with	possibilities	‐	appears	to	be	a	significant	“group	
empathy”	skill,	and	unsurprisingly	the	literature	on	play	provides	strong	models	
for	how	such	skills	are	developed.	Caillois	(1958),	for	example,	subdivides	“play”	
into	agon	(rule‐based	games),	alea	(chance),	mimesis	(imitation)	and	illinx	(or	
vertigo	‐	a	deliberately	induced	alteration	of	perception).	The	role	(and	limits)	of	
mimesis	as	a	strategy	for	the	establishment	of	trust	were	noted	above,	although	
with	agon,	alea	and	illinx	it	encourages	experiment	with	individuality	and	
identity,	regarding	these	as	processual,	contingent,	emergent,	and	co‐constituted	
in	social	action.	These	key	modes	of	human	development	are	improvisational.	
Empathy	is	therefore	a	process	through	which	encounters	with	others	and	
otherness	may	be	productive	of	supplementary	potential	for	the	self:	productive	
of	a	larger,	less	“boundaried”	sense	of	what	a	self	might	be.	
	
	
Grace	and	Danger/Othering	the	Self/Porous	Boundaries	
	
Most	musicians	know	the	capacity	to	pick	up	an	instrument	and	to	find	oneself	an	
hour	later	(the	choice	of	words	is	important),	still	playing,	having	temporarily	
put	the	self	into	a	kind	of	abeyance	‐	attentive	to	musicking,	but	oblivious	to	ego.	
And	when	Billy	Elliot	is	called	for	audition	at	the	Royal	Ballet	in	Stephen	Daldry’s	
eponymous	film,	and	proceeds	in	all	his	supposed	unsophistication	to	
demonstrate	the	sheer	exhilaration	and	beauty	of	the	moving	human	body,	the	
interviewers	ask	him	what	it	feels	like	when	he’s	dancing.	Billy’s	response	is:	
“Once	I	get	going	I	forget	everything	‐.	I	sort	of	disappear”.	
	
When	Penelope	Deutscher,	in	a	wonderful	essay,	contrasts	Sartre	and	de	
Beauvoir’s	descriptions	of	sexual	activity	and	the	erotic,	she	finds	a	crucial	
difference	between	Sartre’s	insistence	that	in	sex	or	desire	he	is	reduced	to	his	
own	body,	and	de	Beauvoir’s	more	subtle	observation	that	“to	touch	the	skin	of	
another,	to	experience	one’s	own	and	the	other’s	desire,	is	a	complex	relation	
both	of	similitude…		…and	of	difference”	(Deutscher	145,	emphasis	added).	
	
To	slightly	rephrase	Deutscher	(147),	the	erotic	is,	for	de	Beauvoir,	the	context	
for	the	rethinking	of	(what	is	valuable	in)	self‐other	relations.	The	erotic	
becomes	a	locus	of	engagement	with	the	difference	of	the	other.	She	quotes	
Debra	Bergoffen,	who	phrases	this	poignantly,	as	“an	ethics	of	protecting	the	
other’s	strangeness”	(151).	So,	for	Deutscher,	in	de	Beauvoir	“the	troubling	and	
threatening	world	that	renders	me	vulnerable”	is	celebrated	as	“an	erotic	world	
in	which	we	are	continually	able	to	experience	as	‘new’”	(151).	Perhaps	this	
“troubling”	or	vulnerable	world	which	de	Beauvoir	celebrates	is	also	the	world	of	
the	improviser	(in	the	broadest	sense):	a	world	in	which	there	is	continuous	
dynamical	reassignment	of	roles,	interpretations,	assumptions.	
	
For	Sartre,	by	contrast,	a	“good”	body	is	“an	invisible	body	of	which	I	am	not	
directly	conscious	as	I	engage	in	activities	in	the	world”(Deutscher	147).	In	
sexual	and	erotic	activity	“reduction	to	the	bodily”	renders	his	concept	of	desire	
“fundamentally	appropriative:	I	touch	the	other’s	flesh	with	hidden	and	self‐
serving	intent,	and	my	strategy	is	to	possess	the	other’s	consciousness”	(152).	
	
It	would	be	easy	to	see	the	musician’s	temporary	“losing”	of	the	self	when	
playing,	or	Billy	Elliot’s	“disappearance”	as	contiguous	with	Sartre’s	“good”	body	
‐	as	disembodied	through	inattention.	But	I’d	argue	that	the	musicianly	“self‐
loss”	and	Billy	Elliot’s	“absence”	are	more	akin	to	de	Beauvoir’s	position:	the	
relationship	with	the	other	‐	whether	with	the	environment	or	the	instrument	‐	
is	extensive	but	non‐appropriative.	The	self	(body)	is	in	an	ethical	relation	with	
otherness.	One	improvisatory	strategy	of	empathy	might	thus	be	in	“othering	the	
self”	through	the	relinquishing	of	familiar	assumptions	that	“control”	or	
“exploration”	must	always	be	conscious	attentive	conduct.12	
	
Instruments	of	Extensive	Sensing	
	
Musical	instruments	are	prosthetic,	amplifying	and	extending	the	reach	of	
human	conduct	and	behavior.	Just	as	the	voice	can	manifest	the	immense	range	
and	complexity	of	human	response,	“performing”	confidence	whilst	betraying	
uncertainty,	for	example,	so	the	materiality	of	physical	musical	instruments	can	
transduce	the	habits	and	characteristics	of	the	player,	affording	the	most	
intimate	and	dynamically	supple	acts	of	calibration:	of	sounding	out	the	space,	
and	of	calibrating	to	others.	The	business	of	calibration	is	not	necessarily	
mimetic.	It	might	be	about	the	mutual	determination	of	separate	positions,	or	the	
exploration	of	precisely	related	difference.	As	I	write,	I’m	imagining	this	as	an	
improvised	musical	context,	but	of	course	in	our	vocal	conduct	‐	through	
performative	talk,	unconscious	utterance	and	propositional	exchange	and	
argument	‐	we	are	“sounding	out”	our	relations	with	the	world	and	others	all	the	
time.	Paradoxically	our	putative	“individuality”	consists	hugely	of	this	processual	
tuning	and	retuning	to	environmental	and	social	context,	and	of	our	subsequent	
reflection	on	or	“replaying	of”	these	interactions.	
	
That	we	have	immense	trust	in	these	processes	is	evident	in	the	language	we	use	
in	extremis:	“I	want	to	hear	that	from	your	own	mouth”	or	“tell	me	that	you	don’t	
love	me”	are	phrases	which	acknowledge	the	voice’s	capacity	to	show	truth,	
whatever	it	is	telling.	Although	“finding	one’s	own	voice”	is	such	a	powerful	
metaphor	of	individuation,	paradoxically	the	sound	of	one’s	own	voice	is	the	one	
embodied	characteristic	which	is	far	clearer	to	others:	it’s	something	to	which	
we	have	objective	access	only	through	recording:	through	being	“reflected	back”	
to	ourselves.	The	business	of	finding	one’s	own	voice	is,	equally	paradoxically,	
largely	the	result	of	that	voice’s	improvised	interaction	with	others.	It	is	co‐
emergent:	a	shifting	outcome	of	its	histories	as	much	as	of	its	physical	attributes.	
In	an	explicitly	musical	context	an	instrument	shares	with	the	voice	the	peculiar	
capacity	to	amplify	hesitation,	inexpertise	or	insecurity,	and	equally	to	transduce	
grace,	“effortlessness”,	control,	certainty	and	inevitability.	Such	capacities	led	
Bennett	Hogg	to	characterize	the	violin,	memorably,	as	a	“lie	detector”	(Hogg	
“The	Resistant	Violin”).	
	
Humans	and	Computers	
	
Following	this	poetic	phrasing	of	the	violin’s	sensor‐like	increasing	of	the	human	
capacity	for	discrimination	and	for	verification,	I’d	like	to	revisit	an	earlier	
assertion	‐	that	in	a	network	of	human	and	non‐human	actors	empathy	might	be	
designed‐for	‐	by	looking	at	some	examples	of	attribution	of	indigenous	agency	to	
circuits,	computers	and	software,	to	knobs	and	physical	interfaces,	and	to	sound	
itself.	This	becomes	urgent	precisely	because	of	the	ubiquity	of	computers,	which	
are	effectively	open‐ended	remapping	machines,	presenting	to	us	possibilities	
for	interactions	largely	independent	of	the	resistances	of	the	material	world.	
Such	resistances	must	therefore	be	consciously	designed	into	such	interactions.	
Thus	far	much	“interaction	design”	has	focused	on	comprehensibility,	ease‐of‐
use,	legibility,	predictabilty.	But	much	in	our	meaningful	engagement	with	
otherness	lies	in	difficulty,	resistance,	unforseeability,	fragility,	ephemerality,	
risk.		
	
The	work	of	John	Bowers	(e.g.,	2003)	is	concerned	with	improvised	conduct	
which	explores	the	relation	of	risk,	unforeseen‐ness,	and	dynamic	adjustment	or	
calibration	to	the	characteristics	of	the	various	actors	or	agents	involved	in	
activity,	but	also	concerns	itself	with	the	extent	to	which	such	conducts	can	be	
designed‐for	in	our	interactions:	counter‐intuitive	principles	for	the	design	of	
improvised	musical	interactions	which	potentially	link	musicking	to	notions	of	
improvisation	as	an	indigenous	conduct	beyond	the	musical.	
	
Bowers	suggests	that	“the	body	is	always	improvising,	impedance	matching	with	
muscles,	conforming	to	the	design	(resistances	and	affordances)	of	the	
interface”.13		In	critically	investigating	the	emerging	principles	of	interaction	
design	and	human‐machine	interfacing,	he	has	identified	(e.g.,	Bowers	and	
Hellström)	four	“transgressive”	principles	of	interaction	design	which	diverge	
significantly	(especially	when	taken	together)	from	those	which	frequently	
inform	“good”	design	practice	(e.g.,	Rovan	et	al.):		
	
(1)	Algorithmic	mediation	stores	muscular	or	tactile	input	in	such	a	
manner	that	its	status	and	relationship	with	a	particular	temporal	
moment	is	malleable.	Rather	than	the	relationship	between	a	gesture	or	a	
complex	developing	behavior	being	“hard‐wired”	a	layer	(or	layers)	of	
data	are	captured	or	stored	for	use	“out‐of‐time”.	Such	mediation,	which	
is	distinct	from	direct	manipulation,	might	serve	to	defamiliarise	us	with	
our	own	characteristic	patterns	of	conduct,	while	retaining	connections	
with	that	past	conduct	which	can	be	revisited	or	repurposed.	(Of	course	at	
some	level	all	digital	information	is	“algorithmically	mediated”	but	here	
the	point	is	that	the	algorithmic	mediation	allows	data	to	be	remapped,	
transformed,	or	moved	in	time).		
	
(2)	Divergent	mappings	deploy	simple	input	devices	to	produce	complex	
results.	Devices	with	a	small	number	of	degrees	of	freedom	(such	as	a	
knob)	are	mapped	to	multiple	complex	behaviours	in	order	to	introduce	
“expressive	lassitude”.	These	require	careful	algorithmic	design	to	
compensate	for	the	small	number	of	input	data	streams.	Such	“divergent”	
or	“few‐to‐many”	mappings	can	help	in	modeling	systems	with	the	
richness	and	complex	interrelationship	of	touch	and	response	
characteristic	of	many	acoustic	musical	instruments.	
	
(3)	Dynamic	adaptation	occurs	when	devices	rescale	or	remap	input	
during	the	time	of	a	performance,	the	interface’s	function	changing	
dynamically	under	algorithmic	control.	This	produces	devices	which	do	
not	respond	in	an	entirely	consistent	and	predictable	manner,	requiring	
constant	attention	and	adjustment	from	the	performer.	
	
(4)	Anisotropic	interaction	space	introduces	non‐linear	and	discontinuous	
mappings,	such	that,	for	example,	gradual	movement	of	a	fader	may	
operate	predictably	over	some	parts	of	its	travel,	but	introduce	radical	
discontinuities	at	others,	perhaps	flipping	into	a	contrasting	behavior	at	a	
dynamically	slightly‐shifting	point,	thus	requiring	real‐time	evaluation	
and	adjustment	on	the	part	of	the	performer.14	
	
Taken	as	a	group	these	design	principles	reintroduce	non‐linearity,	
unpredictability,	unforeseen‐ness,	instability	etc.	in	a	manner	requiring	dynamic,	
adaptive,	improvisational	conduct	of	the	performer.	Used	in	a	musical	context,	
they	encourage	attentive	listening	and	constant	adaptation.	In	a	sense	they	are	
principles	which	design‐for	empathy,	confounding	assumptions	and	emphasizing	
the	dynamism	(and	risk)	of	the	encounter.	
	
Emergent	Outcomes/What	Might	We	Learn	From	Improvising?	
	
My	writing	here	is	consistent	with	my	topic	insofar	as	it	began	without	a	clear	
goal,	seeking	to	collide	listening,	improvisation,	empathy	and	ethics	with	a	view	
to	illuminating	a	network	of	relationships	among	them.	I	didn’t	start	from	a	
blank	page:	it’s	a	pervasive	trope	of	both	the	literature	on	group	improvising	in	
music	(e.g.,	Bailey,	Prévost),	and	of	the	more	informal	discourse	around	it,	that	
this	activity	is	in	some	mysterious	way	necessarily	a	locus	of	empathy,	and	by	
association	with	that	quality	necessarily	generative	of	ethical	conduct.	But	
despite	the	historical	ties	with	collectivist	ideologies	and	broadly	leftist	thought	
evident	in	the	British	flavour	of	“free	improvised”	music	(e.g.,	in	the	work	and	
thought	of	Cornelius	Cardew	(Tilbury),	of	John	Stevens	(1985)	and	of	Eddie	
Prévost	(1995/2004)	it	doesn’t	take	much	digging	to	unearth	within	that	
tradition	the	conflicts,	jealousies	and	territorial	defensiveness	which	are	
prevalent	in	human	social	interaction	everywhere.	
	
I	therefore	find	myself	reversing	the	logic	of	this	familiar	argument,	and	
suggesting	that	rather	than	improvisation	encouraging	empathy,	or	being	
productive	of	ethical	conduct,	the	capacity	for	empathy	is	in	itself	inevitably	
improvisational:	productive	of	improvising.	
	
This	reversal	is	crucial	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	Firstly	it	places	improvisation	
centre‐frame	as	a	key	form	of	organizing	conduct	‐	one	deployed	on	a	daily	
basis	by	all	humans	‐	rather	than	as	something	peripheral	or	specialised.		
Secondly	empathy	can	be	brought	into	conscious	focus	as	a	bunch	of	
improvisatory	skills	to	be	explored	and	exercised:	willingly	approaching	the	
unfamiliar,	the	other,	can	be	a	powerful	tool	for	productive	approaches	to	
relationships,	identities,	processes	and	objects.	It	is	a	true	“research”	ethos	in	
which	prior	assumptions	are	minimised,	suppressed	or	challenged.15	
	
A	quick	review	of	some	other	emergent	thoughts	which	came	into	focus	through	
the	improvisational	process	of	writing	might	include	the	following:	
			
*	Intersensorial	information	is	richer	than	single‐sense	data,	enabling	
better,	suppler,	faster	judgments:	sonic	information	is	intimately	bound	
up	with	the	tactile	and	proxemic.		
	
*	Bodies	are	always	in	complex	dynamic	networks	with	things	and	
environments:	things,	as	much	as	people,	may	be	crucial	in	empathic,	
improvisational	conduct.	
	
*	Timing	is	crucial	at	every	level	from	the	micro‐second	to	the	millenium.	
As	we	never	start	from	an	“ideal”	or	predictable	context	we	(and	our	
objects)	bring	histories	to	the	table	which	construct	us	despite	our	efforts	
to	open	to	the	other.	Improvisation	allows	us	to	evaluate	and	change	
course	without	relying	entirely	on	conscious	processes:	it	can	thus	be	fast.	
	
*	Doing	is	knowing,	without	the	mediation	of	language:	where	language	
takes	time	to	tell,	doing	may	more	quickly	show.	In	tacit	knowledge,	
conduct	is	meaningfulness.	Musical	“free	improvisation”,	for	example,	is	
characterized	by	an	unusually	precise	coincidence	between	making	and	
listening.	
	
*	Although	imitation/mimesis	may	have	a	role	in	empathic	conduct,	
empathy	typically	involves	risk,	including	being	vulnerable	in	the	face	of	
otherness.	
	
*	Individuation	is	a	process,	negotiated	at	least	in	part	through	empathic	
conduct.	
	
*	The	strong	congruence	between	improvisation	and	empathy	is	based	on	
their	shared	preconditions:	trust,	risk‐taking,	and	curiosity	about	“the	
other”.	
	
*	A	capacity	for	empathy	is	developed	through	play.	Modes	of	play	are	
modes	of	improvised	organizing,	often	allowing	for	emergent,	
unforeseeable	outcomes.	
	
*	Music	is	a	key	improvisational	practice	not	least	because	it	has	a	history	
of	devising	instruments	which	extend	intersensorial	capacity.	
	
Empathic	interaction	leaves	time	for	silence:	reflection	is	crucial,	despite	the	
rapid,	supple	and	contingent	nature	of	improvised	conduct.	Empathy	involves	
privileging	“listening”	(in	the	extended	sense	developed	here)	over	“speaking”.	
As	a	rule	of	thumb	one	should	listen	more	than	speaking.	
	
Both	improvisation	and	emergent	outcomes	are	anathema	in	a	world	configured	
to	increase	“productivity”	and	reduce	“risk”.	Yet	the	alternative	is	a	world	in	
which	accountability	is	externally	imposed,	in	which	all	goals	are	pre‐planned,	in	
which	research	is	not	adequately	speculative.	Of	course	an	ethics	of	
responsibility	(self‐accountability),	a	perpetual	opening	of	the	self	to	
vulnerability,	is	not	going	to	be	embraced	by	everyone,	nor	is	it	attainable	for	
everyone,	so	improvised	structures	need	to	be	supple	enough	to	acknowledge	
this.	Much	current	research16	addresses	itself	to	how	(or	even	if)	one	can	study	
groups	of	improvisers	with	emergent	behaviours.	Perhaps	the	ethical	is	the	
emergent	outcome	of	a	network	of	appropriately	or	mutually	empathic	conducts,	
something	which,	like	improvisation,	can	be	designed‐for,	but	never	designed	or	
specified.	
	
I	may	sometimes	seem	to	have	veered	away	from	listening,	but	it	is	my	
contention	that	music,	with	its	basis	in	the	tactile‐sonic,	born	in	the	womb	and	
elaborated	in	the	first	few	months	after	birth,	provides	a	unique	site	for	the	
examination	of	non	appropriative	self‐other	relations.	Of	course,	this	is	not	only	a	
matter	of	listening,	or	if	so,	it’s	a	matter	of	listening	with	the	whole	body	‐	the	
empathic	body.	And	that	empathic	body	is	also	necessarily	an	improvising	body.	
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Notes	
																																																								
1	For	more	information,	see	http://translatingimprovisation.com/about.	
2	“Production”	because	individuality	is	here	regarded	as	processual	rather	than	
fixed,	indeed	the	conception	of	individuation	as	process	is	essential	in	affording	
empathy,	which	thrives	in	contingent,	dynamical	situations.	
3	See	below	for	a	discussion	of	appropriative	and	non‐appropriative	othering	in	
the	context	of	erotic	behavior.		
4	One	might	say	that	the	repetitions	and	redundancies	of	some	Irish	traditional	
music	afford	its	co‐inhabiting	of	a	bar	with	other	social	sounds,	the	detailed	
familial	relations	within	a	string	quartet	demand	a	“chamber”	environment	for	
their	most	successful	apprehension,	and	the	elaborate	virtuosic	pianism	of	Liszt	
or	the	extraordinary	non‐vernacular	technique	of	the	operatic	voice	are	about	
attempting	to	overcome	the	distance	between	performer	and	audience.	
5	I’m	currently	embarking	on	a	study	of	the	precise	manner	in	which	improvising	
musicians	set	up	their	own	physical	environments,	taking	into	account	the	
manner	in	which	“priority	systems”	are	built	into	complex	assemblages	of	
components	through	“handedness”,	adjacency,	and	distributed	forms	of	
autonomy	and	interaction.	
6	Collective	musicking	might	be	regarded	as	a	crucible	for	the	development	and	
management	of	multiple	attentiveness.	In	an	improvised,	unforeseeable	context	
any	channel	of	information,	any	state‐change	might	be	the	“difference	which	
makes	a	difference”	(Bateson	315)	
7	Indeed	musicking	is	regarded	as	co‐extensive	with	other	forms	of	human	
activity	in	which	adaptivity	and	improvisation	are	foregrounded.	
8	And	even	scientific	knowledge	is	best	regarded	as	processual	and	performative	
‐	it’s	just	that	its	time‐scales	are	rather	longer	than	those	of	e.g.	musicking.	In	this	
respect	scientific	knowledge	might	be	regarded	as	analogous	with	our	
interactions	with	the	physical	material	world	‐	which	feel	cumulative	and	
“permanent”	‐	but	the	qualities	we	attribute	to	the	material	world	‐	and	against	
which	we	verify	experience	‐	are	better	regarded	as	“histories”	rather	than	
																																																																																																																																																														
attributes	of	those	materials.	These	are	the	histories	which	construct	mind,	both	
individual	and	social.	
9	And	such	imitative	“co‐feeling”	is	not	inevitably	good,	whether	at	the	level	of	
empathic	mimesis,	or	in	calls	for	the	social	good,	as	both	individuals	and	groups	
can	“manufacture”	consensus.	Acknowledging	the	difference	of	the	other	may	be	
more	productive	(though	more	difficult)	than	superficial	attempts	to	“imagine	
another’s	experience”	which	constitute	some	flavours	of	empathy.	
10	The	word	empathy	does	not	appear	to	have	a	Greek	origin,	growing	rather	
from	the	German	romantic	concept	of	Einfühlung	‐	a	term	from	aesthetics	
describing	the	spectator’s	relation	to	the	art	object.	Perhaps	some	of	this	sense	of	
“reading	out”	of	an	object,	given	a	more	relational	and	dynamic	twist,	indeed	
getting	beyond	the	object	being	an	object,	and	regarding	it	as	a	network	of	both	
potential	and	past	relations	‐	“a	lateral	set	of	associations”	(Bowers	in	
conversation	with	the	author)	might	revitalize	this	earlier	sense	of	empathy	
encompassing	human/non‐human	relationships.	A	continuity	with	the	earlier	
sense	of	the	term	is	retained	too	in	the	capacity	to	somehow	read	out	a	trace	of	
the	producer	of	an	object.	
11	It	is,	in	this	regard,	congruent	with	the	idea	of	“the	gift”	expounded	most	
beautifully	by	Robert	Macfarlane	(2016).	
12	This	might	be	in	the	mode	of	Caillois’	vertigo,	or	in	performing	a	task	with	
“appropriate”	attention	such	that	it	occurs	with	“grace”	(without	excess).	A	banal	
example	of	the	latter	might	be	that	one	can	often	more	successfully	throw	a	ball	
of	paper	into	a	waste	bin	when	conversing	or	otherwise	“distracted”,	than	by	
concentrating	on	the	task.		
13	In	conversation	with	the	author	(April	2016).	
14	Such	behaviours	mimic	the	“bifurcations”	which	occur	in	interaction	with	
some	physical	devices,	John	Coltrane’s	fascination	with	“unstable”	fingerings	on	
the	saxophone	being	a	case	in	point.	
15	Note	that	this	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	“research”	ethos	prevalent	in	current	
UK	higher	education,	which	is	instrumentalised,	goal‐oriented	and	in	which	
“outcomes”	are	over‐determined	by	“methodologies”.	
16	Notably	that	(as	yet	unpublished)	of	my	current	PhD	supervisees	Juan	Manuel	
Loaiza	Restrepo	and	Tristan	Clutterbuck.	
